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Little is known about how prior beliefs impact biophysically
described processes in the presence of neuroactive drugs, which
presents a profound challenge to the understanding of the mecha-
nisms and treatments of addiction. We engineered smokers’ prior
beliefs about the presence of nicotine in a cigarette smoked before
a functional magnetic resonance imaging session where subjects
carried out a sequential choice task. Using a model-based ap-
proach, we show that smokers’ beliefs about nicotine specifically
modulated learning signals (value and reward prediction error)
defined by a computational model of mesolimbic dopamine sys-
tems. Belief of “no nicotine in cigarette” (compared with “nicotine
in cigarette”) strongly diminished neural responses in the striatum
to value and reward prediction errors and reduced the impact of
both on smokers’ choices. These effects of belief could not be
explained by global changes in visual attention and were specific
to value and reward prediction errors. Thus, by modulating the
expression of computationally explicit signals important for valu-
ation and choice, beliefs can override the physical presence of
a potent neuroactive compound like nicotine. These selective
effects of belief demonstrate that belief can modulate model-
based parameters important for learning. The implications of these
findings may be far ranging because belief-dependent effects on
learning signals could impact a host of other behaviors in addiction
as well as in other mental health problems.
nicotine addiction | belief | reinforcement learning | dopamine | fMRI
One materialist view of mental function suggests that eventhe most abstract beliefs can be represented in terms of
physiological states available to the brain (1). These mappings
are critical in conditions like drug addiction, where our igno-
rance of how prior beliefs about drugs influence physiological
processes related to drugs of abuse presents a profound chal-
lenge to the understanding of the mechanism and treatment of
addiction (2, 3). Although extensive work has shown that ad-
dictive drugs act on the mesolimbic dopaminergic (DA) pathway
(2, 4), it has become clear that these purely biochemical ex-
planations are not sufficient to account for the huge heteroge-
neity among drug-dependent individuals and the low success rate
of quitting and remaining drug-free (2, 5) and that cognitive
factors such as beliefs and expectations have a profound impact
on drug-related neurobiological effects (6, 7).
Beliefs are known to contribute to the placebo effect. The
placebo effect is a treatment effect not caused by the physical
presence of an active drug, but rather by the meaning ascribed to
it and the subjective expectation of receiving a treatment (8, 9).
A subject’s belief that he or she is receiving a treatment could
lead to observable improvement even in the absence of active
drugs. These treatment effects are putatively accomplished by
neurobiological processes usually associated with pharmacolog-
ical actions of active drugs, even though active drugs are not
administered (10–14). Interestingly, beliefs also directly impact
behavioral (15–20) and neurophysiological (21–26) responses
when addictive drugs are administered. Drug dependence is
a learned process in which cognitive factors are critical (2, 5,
27–30).
Thus, uncovering the mechanisms by which belief modifies
drug responses is crucial for understanding the causes of and the
treatments for addiction. Importantly, fine-grained quantitative
analyses based on learning models is required to gauge the im-
pact of abstract beliefs on computationally explicit signals and
could help lead to mechanistic explanations for the role of beliefs
in drug addiction. In this study we used computational modeling
and model-based functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
in chronic smokers to investigate the impact of beliefs on com-
putational and neural learning signals.
We hypothesized that smokers’ prior beliefs about nicotine
would influence nicotine effects by selectively modulating neural
learning signals and subsequently modifying choice behavior.
Beliefs about neuroactive substances such as alcohol (21, 22, 26)
and cocaine (23, 24) have been shown to affect brain activity.
Striatal DA levels are also modulated by prediction errors about
alcohol (21). It is thus reasonable to suspect that beliefs about
nicotine could modulate the key neural signals involved in nic-
otine addiction (4, 31). These same neural signals that guide
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learning also guide choice behavior (32, 33) and are disrupted in
nicotine addiction (4, 31, 34–37). Thus, factors that might modulate
neural signals in the striatum, such as smokers’ prior beliefs, could
also impact reinforcement learning behavior in smokers.
To test this hypothesis, we used a within-subject balanced pla-
cebo design where we manipulated 24 smokers’ beliefs about the
absence or presence of nicotine (belief: told “no nicotine” vs. told
“nicotine”) in a denicotinized cigarette or a cigarette with nicotine
(cigarette: placebo vs. nicotine) smoked immediately before an
fMRI session in four separate visits (Fig. 1 and Materials and
Methods). In each visit, subjects carry out a sequential in-
vestment task where they place a bet bt at time t, experience
a fractional change in market price rt = ðpt − pt−1Þ=pt−1 (pt is the
market price at time t), and obtain a gain (or loss) gt = btrt.
Therefore, the task possesses two computationally explicit vari-
ables important for learning: (i) a passive value variable market
return rt that does not depend on choice behavior (bt indepen-
dent) and (ii) a choice-dependent reward prediction error vari-
able TDt defined as the actual gain minus the expected gainegt − ebt (∼ means z scored), where ebt is taken as the proxy for
expected return (37–39) (Materials and Methods). Both variables
have been connected to computational models of dopaminergic
function (40). In our previous work using similar paradigms,
reward prediction error shows up as a strong neural signal in the
striatum (37–39); the neural correlates of the value variable rt
have not been reported using the same task.
Results
Impact of Belief on Neural Responses to Value rt.We first examined
the impact of belief on neural activities related to the value
signal rt (Fig. 2 A and B). When subjects were told “nicotine in
cigarette” and smoked nicotine, they showed significant activa-
tions in bilateral ventral striatum related to the value signal rt
(Fig. 2A and Table S1, P < 0.05 corrected for family-wise error,
PFWE; Materials and Methods). Strikingly, these rt-related stria-
tum activations were significantly attenuated when smokers were
told “no nicotine in cigarette” and had nicotine (Fig. 2A and
Table S1, PFWE < 0.05).
We further extracted parameter estimates related to rt from
regions of interest (ROIs) defined by rt-related striatal activa-
tions from an independent dataset, using the same paradigm (39)
(Materials and Methods and Table S2). This analysis confirmed
that the belief of no nicotine significantly decreased bilateral
striatal activity in the presence of nicotine relative to the belief of
“nicotine present” in these smokers (Fig. 2B, paired t test, t(23) =
2.62 and P < 0.05 for parameter estimates averaged over bilateral
striatum). These results demonstrate a profound impact of belief
about nicotine on neural activities in the ventral striatum when
subjects smoked nicotine.
Impact of Belief on rt-Driven Choice Behavior. We then examined
whether such neural changes are accompanied by explicit be-
havioral alternations modulated by belief (Fig. 2 C and D). We
calculated the weight of market return rt on next bet bt+1, using
a linear mixed-effects multiple-regression model (details in
Materials and Methods). Compared with when told nicotine, the
regression coefficient of rt on next bet bt+1 was significantly re-
duced when subjects were told no nicotine [t(16,885) = 5.07, P <
0.0001, Fig. 2C; Table S3 shows list of all regressors], even though
they smoked nicotine in both conditions.
An additional Bayesian analysis confirmed such separation
between the regression coefficient distributions of told no nico-
tine (mean = 2.75) and told nicotine (mean = 3.82) conditions,
when nicotine was delivered (Fig. 2D, posterior probability of
told nicotine > told no nicotine = 1; Materials and Methods).
Both analyses suggest that belief about the absence of nicotine
significantly tempered the impact of the value signal on choice
behavior, compared with when subjects believed there was nic-
otine in the cigarette, despite the presence of nicotine in
both conditions.
Impact of Belief Neural Responses to Reward Prediction Error TDt .
Next, we examined the neural impact of belief on the reward
prediction error signal TDt when subjects smoked a cigarette
with nicotine (Fig. 3 A and B). Whole-brain analysis suggests that
there were significant activations in the striatum related to the
reward prediction error signal TDt when subjects were told nic-
otine and smoked nicotine (Fig. 3A and Table S4; PFWE < 0.05).
Similar to the value signal rt, these TDt-related striatum activa-
tions were attenuated when smokers were told no nicotine in
cigarette (Fig. 3A and Table S4; PFWE < 0.05), even though
nicotine was delivered in both conditions.
These whole-brain analysis results were further confirmed by
an ROI analysis based on TDt-related striatum activation from
an independent study, using the same paradigm (39) (Table S2):
There was significant attenuation in neural responses in the
striatum to TDt when smokers were told no nicotine relative to
when they were told nicotine, although they smoked nicotine in
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Fig. 1. Experimental procedure. Twenty-four smokers completed four ses-
sions of fMRI scanning in four separate visits. In each session, subjects were
given a denicotinized cigarette or a cigarette with nicotine (cigarettes:
placebo vs. nicotine) to smoke and were told that the cigarette had no
nicotine or had nicotine (belief: told no nicotine vs. told nicotine). Immedi-
ately after smoking, subjects performed a sequential investment task in the
scanner where they made 20 investment decisions bt (0 ∼ 100% of current
running total, number displayed on lower left side of the screen, e.g., $104)
during each market, for a total of 10 markets. Market return rt was dis-
played on the lower right side of the screen (e.g., −1.2%). Carbon monoxide
(CO) levels were measured both in the beginning and at the end of the
experiment (Materials and Methods and Fig. S2).
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Fig. 2. Impact of belief on the value signal rt . (A) Beliefs about nicotine
modulated rt-related ventral striatum activation (PFWE < 0.05; displayed at
P < 0.001 uncorrected for visualization). (B) Region of interest analysis (peaks
[−12, 8, −6] and [12, 10, −6]; Table S2) (39) confirmed whole-brain results
shown in A. (C) The weight of market return rt on choice behavior (next bet
bt+1) was significantly reduced when told no nicotine than told nicotine,
despite the presence of nicotine in both conditions. (D) Bayesian analysis
confirmed the separation between the posterior distributions of the be-
havioral regression coefficient of market return rt of told nicotine and told
no nicotine. ***P < 0.001. Data are represented as mean ± SEM.
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both conditions [Fig. 3B and paired t test, t(23) = 1.72, P = 0.1 for
left striatum ROI; not significant for right striatum ROI].
Impact of Belief on TDt-Driven Choice Behavior. We then examined
whether such neural changes are reflected in behavior related to the
reward prediction error signal TDt. Using a second linear mixed-
effect regression model (Materials and Methods), we found that
there was a significant reduction in the influence of TDt on the next
investment bt+1 in the told no nicotine condition compared with the
told nicotine condition, despite the presence of nicotine in both
conditions [Fig. 3C and Table S5; t(16,885) = 3.72, P < 0.001].
A Bayesian analysis further confirmed the separation between
the distributions of these regression coefficients of told nicotine
(mean = 0.22) and told no nicotine (mean = 0.16) conditions
when nicotine was delivered (Fig. 3D, posterior probability of
told nicotine > told no nicotine = 0.996; Materials and Methods).
Taken together, these results suggest that belief about nicotine also
modulated the neural representations of the reward prediction er-
ror signal TDt and brought related behavioral changes in smokers.
Belief Did Not Modulate Neural Activities in Visual Attentional Areas.
The next question we asked was whether the effect of belief was
specific to learning signals or related to global changes in visual
attention. To answer this question, we examined neural activities
related to viewing market price (onset of market reveals rounds
2–19; details in Materials and Methods). The whole-brain analysis
of the “market price reveal” regressor showed similar levels of
activation in inferior and middle occipital gyri, inferior parietal
lobule, and inferior frontal gyrus when subjects were told there
was nicotine and smoked nicotine and when they were told no
nicotine and smoked nicotine (Fig. 4A and Table S6, PFWE <
0.05). Direct comparison between told no nicotine and told
nicotine conditions did not yield any significant activation even
at a very liberal threshold of P < 0.01 uncorrected. Furthermore,
ROI analysis based on visual attentional seeds from the same
independent study (Fig. 4B and Table S7) confirmed that there
was no significant difference in any of these visual attention-
related ROIs (inferior occipital gyrus, inferior parietal lobule, and
inferior frontal gyrus) between told no nicotine and told nicotine
conditions (Ps > 0.1). Taken together, these results suggest that
belief did not impact neural activities in visual attentional regions
and that the effect of belief was selective to the value signal and the
reward prediction error signal.
Impact of Belief on the Value Signal and the Reward Prediction Error
Signal in Placebo Conditions. The above results demonstrate the
effects of belief about nicotine on learning signals when subjects
smoked a cigarette that contained nicotine. We also examined the
impact of belief on the value signal rt and the reward prediction
error signal TDt in the placebo conditions (Fig. S1 and Tables S1
and S3–S5). Belief of no nicotine did not significantly modify
neural activations in the striatum related to rt (Fig. S1A), yet re-
duced TDt-related right striatum activation (Fig. S1B) in the pla-
cebo conditions. Behaviorally, belief about the absence of nicotine
reduced the weights of both the value signal rt (P < 0.05; Fig. S1C)
and the reward prediction error signal TDt (P < 0.05; Fig. S1D) on
choice behavior when subjects smoked a denicotinized cigarette.
These results further demonstrate the impact of belief on com-
putational learning signals even in the absence of nicotine and
suggest that such impact had differential effects on the value signal
rt and the reward prediction error signal TDt neurally.
Discussion
Our main findings are twofold. First, smokers’ beliefs about
nicotine’s presence modulated the neural representation of a
computationally explicit value signal rt in the striatum, as well as the
impact of rt on choice behavior. Second, belief about nicotine also
modulated neural activity in the striatum related to the reward
prediction error signal TDt and the impact of TDt on subjects’
choice behavior. We further demonstrated that these effects of
belief were not observed for neural activities related to general vi-
sual attentional processes in fronto-parietal and occipito-temporal
regions and were specific to striatal learning signals. These results
provide compelling evidence demonstrating that prior beliefs about
nicotine have the capacity to override the presence of a powerful
neuroactive drug like nicotine by selectively modulating biophysi-
cally described processes in a fashion that correlates with measur-
able impact on learning and choice behavior.
Several previous studies have examined neural responses
modulated by beliefs and expectancy about substances of abuse
told "no nicotine"
smoked nicotine
told "nicotine"
smoked nicotine
A B
C D
***
y=4              y=4
told "no nicotine"
smoked nicotine
told "nicotine"
smoked nicotine
told "no nicotine"
smoked nicotine
told "nicotine"
smoked nicotine
5
0
pa
ra
m
et
er
 e
st
im
at
e 
of
 re
w
ar
d 
pr
ed
ic
tio
n 
er
ro
r
3000
2000
0                   0.05                 0.10                 0.15                0.20                 0.25                 0.30
1000
00.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
left striatum right striatum
told "no nicotine",
smoked nicotine
told "nicotine",
smoked nicotine
be
ha
vi
or
al
 re
gr
es
si
on
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f T
D
t
Reward prediction error TDt -related brain 
activation
Posterior distribution of coefficient of 
reward prediction error TDt
Region-of-interest analysis: 
market return TDt -related striatal activation
Influence of reward prediction error TDt  on 
next bet
Fig. 3. Impact of belief on the reward prediction error signal TDt . (A) Beliefs
about nicotine modulated TDt -related striatum activation (PFWE < 0.05; dis-
played at P < 0.001 uncorrected for visualization). (B) Region of interest
analysis (peaks [−18, 0, −8] and [12, 8, −2]; Table S2) (39) confirmed whole-
brain results shown in A. (C) The weight of reward prediction error TDt on
choice behavior (next bet bt+1) was significantly reduced when told no nic-
otine than told nicotine, in the presence of nicotine. (D) Bayesian analysis
confirmed the separation between the posterior distributions of the behav-
ioral regression coefficient of reward prediction error TDt of told nicotine and
told no nicotine. ***P < 0.001. Data are represented as mean ± SEM.
told “no nicotine”, smoked nicotine told “nicotine”, smoked nicotine
A
B
x=50
Market reveal-related neural activities
difference
x=50 x=50
6
0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
told "no nicotine",
smoked nicotine
told "nicotine",
smoked nicotine
R inferior temporal gyrus R inferior parietal lobule R inferior frontal gyrus
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
told "no nicotine",
smoked nicotine
told "nicotine",
smoked nicotine
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
told "no nicotine",
smoked nicotine
told "nicotine",
smoked nicotine
Fig. 4. Belief did not modulate neural activities in visual attentional regions.
(A) Whole-brain analysis of the market reveal regressor suggests that smokers
showed equivalent levels of activations in occipito-temporal visual areas and
fronto-parietal regions involved in attention when told no nicotine and told
nicotine (PFWE < 0.05, displayed at P < 0.001 uncorrected for visualization,
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corrected). (B) ROI analysis based on an independent dataset (39) confirmed
that belief about nicotine did not significantly modulate neural activities in
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inferior parietal lobule [30, −54, 48], and inferior frontal gyrus [52, 12, 20] (all
Ps > 0.1; details in Materials and Methods and Table S7).
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such as cocaine and alcohol (21, 23, 24, 26). In cocaine abusers,
expectations about receiving methylphenidate increased metab-
olism measured by positron emission tomography (PET) in the
thalamus, occipital lobe, and cerebellum, but decreased metab-
olism in the orbitofrontal gyrus (24). Expectations of receiving
cocaine (23) and alcohol (26) were found to modulate fMRI
blood-oxygen-level dependent (BOLD) signals in frontal and
anterior cingulate regions in addicted individuals. Interestingly,
one PET study found that negative drug prediction errors (i.e.,
alcohol expected but not delivered) decreased striatal DA con-
centrations while positive drug prediction errors (i.e., alcohol not
expected but delivered) increased striatal DA levels in individuals
with alcohol dependence (21), which is consistent with our finding
of modifiable striatal responses by beliefs. Furthermore, our
findings extend previous results showing the impact of beliefs on
behavioral performances and subjective states related to nicotine
intake (15–17, 20) by detailing the specific neural and computa-
tional mechanisms underlying the impact of beliefs on drug effects.
These selective effects demonstrate that belief can modulate
model-based parameters important for learning and suggest that
belief serves as an important cognitive mechanism in addiction.
The implications of these findings are far ranging, because
learning is critically involved in drug addiction (2, 5, 27–30).
Addictive drugs bring rewarding feelings and subjective utility,
which establishes the chosen drug as a reinforcer for drug-
seeking and drug-taking behavior; over time, conditioned
responses are developed and drug use evolves into a learned
habit (5, 27–29). In this sense, learning is closely associated
with motivational (“wanting”), affective (“liking”), and executive
processes in addiction (29, 41). Thus, belief-dependent effects on
generic learning signals could impact a vast range of other
behaviors in addiction. Future studies using longitudinal designs
are needed to address the issue of how belief directly influences
learning and other aspects of addiction during the formation of
addictive behavior, which would significantly advance our un-
derstanding of the mechanisms of the acquisition of addiction.
Our results also suggest the possibility of using manipulated
beliefs to modify abnormal neural and behavioral responses in
addicted individuals. To date, a great deal of effort has been
made to identify methods that can reverse drug-related reward
responses through manipulations of the mesolimbic DA path-
way. In rodent models, pharmacological intervention (42, 43),
genetic modification (34), and optogenetic stimulation (44) have
shown initial success in reversing drug-induced behavior by act-
ing on DA signaling. In humans, both pharmacological and
cognitive therapies have been used, although studies have
reported mixed findings regarding their general effectiveness
(45). Here we show that the mere subjective belief of no nicotine
in cigarette exerted a strong reversal effect by attenuating neural
responses in the striatum, even in the presence of a powerful
neuroactive drug like nicotine. Crucially, these neural effects
brought measurable changes in smokers’ choice behavior. Taken
together, these results suggest that cognitive beliefs could be as
potent as pharmacological interventions in terms of modifying
biophysical processes in the brain and changing behavior in
addicted individuals. It remains an open question of whether
systematically managed beliefs could reliably influence neural
signals over time and result in long-lasting changes in behavior.
Future longitudinal experiments could potentially answer this
question, which will have important implications for the recovery
from and treatment of addiction.
Furthermore, our results suggest that DA abnormality is crit-
ical, but not sufficient, to account for addiction. Addictive drugs
and natural rewards have been shown to act on the same neu-
rophysiological processes of DA signaling (28, 36). Increased
neural activity in the striatum in response to drug reward and
drug cues and the lack of striatum activation in response to other
natural rewards in the absence of drugs have therefore been
considered a hallmark of addiction (2, 4, 28, 29, 42). If drug-
induced DA release were sufficient to account for addiction,
however, nicotine intake would increase DA release and neural
activities in the striatum regardless of contextual constraints or
top–down beliefs about nicotine’s presence in our experimental
setting. Here we show that although smokers did show a “normal”
level of striatum activation related to reinforcement learning sig-
nals after nicotine intake, these neural activities can be significantly
diminished by a top–down belief of no nicotine in cigarette even
when the same amount of nicotine was administered. Thus, al-
though it might account for physical dependence, DA abnormality
alone is not sufficient to account for the whole collection of ad-
dictive symptoms. Cognitive mechanisms implemented in distrib-
uted neural circuitries beyond the mesolimbic DA system are
also crucial for addiction (2, 3).
In summary, the current findings tap into an important yet
underinvestigated question in addiction research of how high-
level cognitive factors such as beliefs could impact or counter
drug effects (30, 46). Knowing the exact mechanisms through
which beliefs work would contribute to the understanding of the
causes and treatments of addiction, as well as a wide range of
other mental health problems. It would also lead to further in-
quiries about how top–down beliefs can modulate biological
processes in general to effect personal and even societal changes.
Materials and Methods
Participants. Twenty-eight smokers were recruited from community pop-
ulations in Houston, Texas. Three smokers were excluded because they had
carbon monoxide (CO) levels outside the acceptable range. One additional
smoker was excluded because of obvious alcohol intoxication. Other exclusion
criteria were (i) left handed; (ii) claustrophobia; (iii) Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th edition, Axis I or II diagnosis (47), exclusive of
nicotine dependence; (iv) pregnant; (v) contraindications to MRI, pacemaker,
aneurysm clips, neurostimulators, cochlear implants, metal in eyes, steel worker,
or other implants; (vi) active medical or neurologic disorder; (vii) history of drug
dependence (other than tobacco or alcohol); (viii) history of head injuries
resulting in loss of consciousness >10 min; and (ix) nonsmoker. This yielded
a final sample of 24 smokers (9 females). Other demographic and clinical
characteristics are as follows (mean ± SD): age, 39 ± 14 y old; education, 13 ±
3 y; daily cigarettes, 17 ± 9; smoking history, 22 ± 15 y.
Subjects had normal or adjusted to normal vision, had no contradiction to
MRI, and reported no previous or current psychiatric or neurological con-
ditions. Subjects were informed of the study requirements and provided
written consent before participation. The study was approved by the In-
stitutional Review Board of the Baylor College of Medicine ethics committee.
Experimental Protocol. Smokers were instructed to smoke as usual and upon
arrival at the laboratory, to smoke until satiated. Using a balanced placebo
design, each smoker came to the laboratory on four separate days and re-
ceived each of the four conditions: told no nicotine and received a cigarette
with nicotine (Quest Brand, 0.6 mg of nicotine), told no nicotine and received
a placebo cigarette (Quest Brand, 0.06 mg of nicotine), told nicotine and
received a cigarette with nicotine, and told nicotine and received a placebo
cigarette. Before the experiment, subjects were informed that they would
receive either a nicotine cigarette or a placebo cigarette and that a research
staff member would tell them whether they would be smoking a nicotine
cigarette or a placebo cigarette. Therefore, subjects had no prior knowledge
about the experimental manipulation and were debriefed only after they
completed all four visits. The experiment was designed to be double blind.
Although the experimenters administering the cigarette to the subject de-
veloped their own beliefs about the contents of the cigarettes for some
fraction of the subjects, the double-blind protocol was not broken during
data collection. Two other experimenters who were completely blind to the
data collection procedure performed the data analysis.
The order of the four visits was randomly assigned to each subject. Upon
arrival at the laboratory, exhaled CO was measured for each subject. CO level
did not differ between told nicotine, smoked nicotine and told no nicotine,
smoked nicotine conditions or between told nicotine, smoked placebo and
told no nicotine, smoked placebo conditions before the experiment (Ps > 0.1;
Fig. S2A). Subjects also completed a battery of surveys on demographic in-
formation and smoking history. All subjects then received a cigarette and
suggestion immediately before the scanning session. CO levels were measured
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again after the scanning session: CO level did not differ between told nic-
otine, smoked nicotine and told no nicotine, smoked nicotine conditions or
between told nicotine, smoked placebo and told no nicotine, smoked pla-
cebo conditions after the experiment (Ps > 0.1; Fig. S2B).
Stimuli and Task. Participants performed a sequential investment task (Fig. 1)
based on historical stock markets, similar to the ones used in previous studies
(37–39). Participants were endowed with 100 monetary units at the begin-
ning of the experiment and were informed that their final payment would
be scaled according to their score in the experiment. Each subject played
a total of 10 markets in each visit and each market block consisted of 20
event-related trials. At the beginning of each market block, a screen that
indicated “new market” was shown, followed by a display of initial market
history. The subject then made 20 sequential investment decisions bt (0 ∼
100% of current portfolio) without a time constraint, using a slider bar.
Therefore, the trials were jittered by the natural variability in subjects’ re-
sponse times. A total of 750 ms after they submitted their choices, the
market price pt was revealed and the fractional market price change and
subjects’ portfolios were updated. Market information for all previous seg-
ments then remained on the screen until the end of each trial. The slider bar
then changed from gray to red after an intertrial interval of 750 ms, and
subjects started to make investment decisions for the next trial. A total of 40
different markets were used with 10 different markets for each of the four
visits. The mean reaction time (RT) was 2.76 s with a SD of 1.27 s. The ex-
perimental length was 844 s on average with a SD of 253 s. There was no
difference between conditions in terms of either RT or task length (all
Ps > 0.1).
Behavioral Data Analysis.
Linear mixed-effects multiple-regression model. We first examined the impact of
the value signal market return rt on subjects’ next bet bt+1, using a linear
mixed-effects multiple-regression model (48). This model allows flexible han-
dling of complex group data structure and takes into account both fixed and
random effects. The value signal at time t is defined as market return rt, that is,
the relative change in market price (pt − pt−1)/pt−1. The regression was per-
formed simultaneously across all four conditions by coding the four conditions
(told no nicotine and received placebo, told nicotine and received placebo, told
no nicotine and received nicotine, and told nicotine and received nicotine) as
four indicator variables (told0-nic0, told1-nic0, told0-nic1, and told1-nic1) for
each smoker group separately and by including a term in the regression of the
form condition regressor for each indicator and regressor (Table S3 shows
a complete list of regressors and fixed-effect coefficients). Specifically, if we let
lT0,t be the indicator function for trials t where the subject has been told the
cigarette does not contain nicotine, lT1,t be the indicator function for trials t
where the subject has been told the cigarette contains nicotine, lN0,t be the
indicator function for trials t where the subject receives a placebo cigarette,
and lN1,t be the indicator function for trials t where the subject receives a cig-
arette with nicotine, then the model for subject j is given by
~bt+1,j= β1 ·1T0,t · 1N0,t + β2 ·1T1,t ·1N0,t + β3 ·1T0:t · 1N1,t + β4 ·1T1,t ·1N1,t
+

β5 · 1T0,t ·1N0,t + β6 ·1T1,t · 1N0,t + β7 ·1T0,t ·1N1,t + β8 ·1T1,t · 1N1,t

· ~bt,j
+

β9 · 1T0,t ·1N0,t + β10 · 1T1,t ·1N0,t + β11 · 1T0,t ·1N1,t + β12 · 1T1,t · 1N1,t

· rt,j
+

Zj ·uj

t + «t ,
where the random effect for subject j is given by

Zj ·uj

t=

u1,j · 1T0,t ·1N0,t +u2,j ·1T1,t · 1N0,t +u3,j ·1T0,t ·1N1,t+u4,j · 1T1,t · 1N1,t

+

u5,j ·1T0,t · 1N0,t +u6,j ·1T1,t ·1N0,t +u7,j · 1T0,t · 1N1,t +u8,j ·1T1,t · 1N1,t

· ~bt
+

u9,j ·1T0,t · 1N0,t +u10,j ·1T1,t ·1N0,t +u11,j · 1T0,t · 1N1,t +u12,j ·1T1,t · 1N1,t

· rt:
Here Zj is the design matrix for the random effects, uj is the vector of ran-
dom effects for subject j, fbt,j is the within-subject z-normalized (over the
entire experiment for subject j) bet, «t,j ∼Nð0,σ2Þ IID, uj ∼Nð0,ΣÞ, IID, and
« and u are independent. Linear contrasts were then carried out to test the
significance of differences between coefficients.
A similar regression was carried out separately for TDt . The reward pre-
diction error signal TDt is calculated as egt − ebt , that is, the difference be-
tween the actual gain (gt =btrt) and the expected gain ebt , where ∼ here
means causal z score (z score over the bets/returns that have occurred up to
and including time t), and the bet bt serves as the proxy for the expected
gain. Table S5 includes a complete list of regressors and fixed-effect coef-
ficients. The analyses were carried out in R (49) with the function lme (for
the mixed regression) in the package lmer (50) and the function estimable
(for the linear contrasts) in the package gmodels (51). Statistical significance
was determined at P < 0.05, two tailed. The first bet and the last bet of each
market were excluded to keep consistent with the fMRI analysis. Addition-
ally, two smokers did not change their bets in one of the four sessions and
the three corresponding sessions’ behavioral data were excluded from the
behavioral analysis.
Hierarchical Bayesian model. To further examine the possible effects of the
autoregressive nature of the above multiple-regression analysis on the re-
gression coefficients, we also analyzed the data using a full hierarchical
Bayesian model in rjags (52). The model is specified hierarchically (code
available upon request). At the top level we assume that for each subject i,
in condition j (j = 1–4, corresponding to the 2 × 2 design) the normalized (see
above) bet on trial k, yi,j,k , given the normalized previous bet, the previous
return, and parameters was distributed as
yi,j,k
μði,j,kÞ, τ∼Normalμði,j,kÞ,τ,
where
μði,j,kÞ= α0ðiÞ+ β0ðjÞ+ α1ðiÞ · yi,j,k−1 + β1ðjÞ · yi,j,k−1 + α2ðiÞ · ri,j,k−1+  β2ðjÞ · ri,j,k−1:
Here τ is the precision for the normal distribution. Next, at the coefficient
level we assume for every subject i and condition j (and for each coefficient,
indexes suppressed)
αðiÞtau1∼Normalð0, tau1Þ
βðjÞb, tau2∼Normalðb, tau2Þ
and then finally for the last level
tau1∼gammað1,:1Þ
tau2∼gammað1,:1Þ
b∼Normalð0,:01Þ:
The sampler used three chains, 500 as the number of adaptive steps, 2,500
steps for burning in the chains, and 25,003 total saved steps. Note that for the
two subjects for whom we had good data only in three conditions, we simply
omitted the missing condition in the above.
Image Acquisition and Preprocessing. The anatomical and functional imaging
was conducted on a 3.0 Tesla Siemens Trio scanner at Baylor College ofMedicine.
High-resolution T1-weighted scans (1.0 × 1.0 × 1.0 mm) were acquired using an
MP-RAGE sequence. Functional images were acquired using echo-planar imag-
ing (EPI) and angled 30° with respect to the anterior–posterior commissural line.
The detailed settings for the functional imaging were repetition time (TR) =
2,000 ms, echo time (TE) = 25 ms, flip angle = 90°, 37 slices, and voxel size = 3.4 ×
3.4 × 4.0 mm. The average number of functional images acquired was 418 with
a SD of 122. One fMRI run was acquired in each visit.
All imaging data were preprocessed using standard statistical parametric
mapping (SPM8, Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience) algorithms
(fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). Functional images were motion corrected using a six-
parameter rigid-body transformation to the first functional scan and unwarped
using nonlinear basis functions. The mean functional images for each subject
were coregistered to the subject’s high-resolution T1 structural scan, using
a 12-parameter affine transformation. The subject’s T1 image was seg-
mented into gray and white matter and then normalized using nonlinear
basis functions to the Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) template, and
the functional images normalized to the template, with resampled 4 × 4 ×
4-mm functional voxels. Functional images were smoothed spatially using an
isotropic 8-mm full-width at half-maximum (FWHM) Gaussian kernel.
General Linear Modeling. Event-related analyses of the fMRI data were con-
ducted using SPM8. General linearmodeling (GLM) (53) was conducted for the
functional scans from each participant by modeling the observed BOLD sig-
nals and regressors to identify the relationship between the task events and
the hemodynamic response. Regressors related to all visual and motor events
were created by convolving a train of delta functions representing the se-
quence of individual events with the default basis function in SPM8, which
consists of a synthetic hemodynamic response function composed of two
gamma functions (53, 54).
We specified two separate GLMs for each subject. In both GLMs, we in-
cluded the following regressors: (i) market type display, (ii) market history
display, (iii) all key presses, (iv) market price reveal of round 1, (v) market
price reveal of rounds 2–19, and (vi) market price reveal of round 20. Ad-
ditionally, six parameters generated during motion correction were entered
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as covariates. In the first GLM, market value rt was entered as parametric
regressors at the fifth regressor (market price reveal of rounds 2–19); in the
second GLM, reward prediction error TDt was entered as parametric regres-
sors at the fifth regressor (market price reveal of rounds 2–19). Regressors
were orthogonalized in a standard SPM8 fashion. Linear contrasts of the
parameter estimates were made to identify the effects of rt and TDt for each
participant. These images from all participants were then entered into a sec-
ond-level group analysis to implement a random-effects statistical model. A
within-subject ANOVA model was conducted with the following factors:
belief (told no nicotine vs. told nicotine) and cigarette (placebo vs. nicotine).
Significant activations related to rt and TDt were identified at the level of P <
0.05 corrected for family-wise errors in conjunction with k > 2. Small volume
correction (SVC) was used for regions of a priori interest, namely, bilateral
striatum. SVC was conducted using a search volume of a sphere of 5 mm
radius (640 mm3, 10 voxels) centered at [−12, 8, −6] and [12, 10, −6] for r and
[−18, 0, −8] and [12, 8, −2] for TD, with masks based on striatum activations
from an independent study as listed in Table S2 (39).
ROI Analysis. We conducted ROI analysis, using an unbiased approach of
defining striatum ROIs based on an independent fMRI study that included 63
healthy participants (age 32 ± 13 y, 34 females) who performed a similar
sequential investment task (39). First, we identified the peaks of striatum
activation related to the same regressor rt and TDt from this in-
dependent dataset: [−12, 8, −6] and [12, 10, −6] for rt and [−18, 0, −8]
and [12, 8, −2] for TDt (Table S2). Second, using the MarsBaR toolbox
(marsbar.sourceforge.net/), we created spherical ROIs with a 5-mm ra-
dius of bilateral ventral striatum centered at thee peaks. We also de-
fined visual attentional ROIs related to market reveal as spheres with
a 5-mm radius for the following regions: inferior temporal gyrus [48,
−62, −2], inferior parietal lobule [30, −54, 48], and inferior frontal gyrus
[52, 12, 20] (Table S7). Third, individual subject’s parameter estimates
were then extracted from each ROI for each task condition and entered
into paired t tests.
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